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Rumination: Practicing Retrieval of Autobiographical Memories 
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Abstract 
Background: People who ruminate about negative personal experiences seem to be engaged in 
practicing retrieval, with the expected consequences of perpetuating those very memories (see 
Roediger & Butler, 2011). 
Method: To provide an experimental model of the effect of retrieval practice on subsequent 
recall of autobiographical memories, we recruited students with low and high scores on the 
Ruminative Response Scale (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003), gave them positive 
and ruminative cues to generate memories, and cued three rounds of practice of half of the 
memories from each valence. 
Results: A week later, final cued recall for all memories showed strong practice effects, with the 
exception that ruminators benefited very little from the request to practice positive memories. 
Conclusion: Recalling personal memories benefits from prior practice in bringing them to mind. 
However, these results provide insufficient evidence to recommend training recall of positive 
autobiographical memories to counteract rumination. 
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Rumination: Practicing Retrieval of Autobiographical Memories 
 Personal experience suggests that the more often we think a thought, the more often we 
continue to think that thought; the thought becomes a habit. This aphorism has been expressed in 
philosophical psychology of old (James, 1890), and it crudely represents the more modern 
science of transfer-appropriate processing (Morris, Bransford, & Franks, 1977) and retrieval 
practice (Bjork, 1975, Roediger & Butler, 2011), as well as the clinically relevant phenomena 
called rumination, worry, and repetitive thinking. Thus, the persistence of practiced thought has 
captured attention across subdisciplines of psychology.  
Rumination is a term that refers to the largely self-focused, repetitive, and negative 
mental experiences that typify depressed and anxious individuals (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & 
Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2014). An early classic study of rumination 
and autobiographical memory (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998) revealed that 
scores on a standard rumination instrument were positively correlated with the production of 
negatively biased personal memories. Ruminators remembered negative events, possibly because 
they had practiced retrieving them. During the years since that ovular contribution, a wide stream 
of research has dedicated itself to discovering the cognitive characteristics of rumination, 
sometimes with the goal of reducing the tendency to ruminate in the service of treating anxious 
or depressed individuals. Deficient cognitive control has emerged as a clear hallmark of 
ruminative tendencies (see the meta-analysis by Zetsche, Burkner, & Schulze, 2018); for 
example, ruminators do not easily switch attention from negative experimental material 
(Joormann & Gotlib, 2008), but some evidence suggests that they can be trained to do so in ways 
that reduce their ruminative tendencies (Cohen, Mor, & Henik, 2015). Similarly, compared to 
others, ruminators show smaller effects of suppression practice and directions to forget on 
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subsequent memory tasks (Fawcett et al., 2015; Hertel, Maydon, Ogilvie, & Mor, 2018; 
Joormann & Tran, 2009). They are also quick to interpret ambiguous events negatively. That 
tendency contributes to rumination, given experimental evidence that training a ruminative 
interpretation bias creates negatively biased recall of new ambiguous situations and higher 
rumination scores (Hertel, Mor, Ferrari, Hunt, & Agarwal, 2014).  The good news is that training 
ruminators to ignore negative material can reduce subsequent memory bias (Daches, Mor, & 
Hertel, 2019). These findings on deficient control, habitual biases, and efforts to correct both are 
just a sampling of the wide literature on rumination and cognition, but evidence thus far had not 
connected rumination directly to the practice of repeated retrieval. 
The aspect of ruminative remembering that interests us is repetitive focus on specific past 
events, not merely on a larger number of negative events (as in mood-congruent memory), but 
the same event(s) retrieved repeatedly. Recently, Hertel, Maydon, Cottle, and Vrijsen (2017)  
brought the science of retrieval practice to bear on the question of that persistence (also see 
Vrijsen, Hertel, & Becker, 2016). The experiment consisted of a learning phase in which 
ruminative and other students studied word pairs with negative, neutral (as fillers), and positive 
connotations. The negative pairs represented concerns that these students might have developed 
(e.g., embarrassing body), whereas the positive pairs represented happier experiences (e.g., 
praised paper). In each of three rounds in the next phase, the participants studied all materials 
and then practiced recalling the nouns when cued with the adjectives from the neutral pairs and 
either the negative or the positive pairs (or they studied without retrieval practice).  At the end of 
the session, an immediate test cued recall of half of the nouns of each emotional valence 
(practiced and not), and then all nouns were tested two days later. The interesting combination of 
outcomes in this experiment was that non-practiced nouns showed a ruminative bias as strong as 
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any practice effect on the immediate test, but two days later only the practice effects remained 
(and they were substantial). The authors suggested that practicing positive memories might 
thereby provide a mechanism for counteracting the habitual bias that so clearly perpetuates 
rumination and contributes to depression. 
 The obvious next step was to conduct a similar study with autobiographical memories 
instead of word pairs. First, however, it was important to discover whether practice effects could 
obtain in the realm of autobiographical memory and, secondarily, whether the practice effects 
would be emotionally congruent or incongruent with the participants’ naturally occurring habits 
of thought.  The tendency to think habitually about negative memories, for example, might 
suggest that corresponding practice effects would be smaller because even the unpracticed items 
might be memorable for other reasons. On the other hand, ruminators might be less inclined to 
practice positive memories along with negative memories, and this outcome would suggest 
difficulties in using positive memories to overcome ruminative tendencies. These are the issues 
we addressed in the current experiment. 
 Whenever autobiographical memories are sought in the laboratory, cues must first be 
established. This procedure is not very different from what happens naturally, as memories are 
brought to mind in the real world. Someone might mention a paper that she wrote recently and 
then the self-focused listener might involuntarily recall a recent similar experience. We therefore 
provided cues in the generation phase of the experiment and again later during practice and on 
the tests. However, during generation (only), we manipulated the emotional valence of the 
generated memory by pairing the cue with an adjective (failing paper for some, praised paper 
for others). Again, we expected to find practice effects on a delayed test, and we were curious 
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about whether they would be qualified by the relation of rumination to the emotional nature of 
the original cues and corresponding memories.   
Method 
Overview  
 The phases of Session 1 consisted of memory generation, three rounds of retrieval 
practice for half of the memories, and an immediate cued-recall test for an orthogonal half of the 
memories. One week later we sent participants a link to a Qualtrics-implemented test of all 
memories initially generated. The procedure conceptually replicated those used by Hertel et al. 
(2017), with some important exceptions. First, instead of assigning participants to practice 
targets in response to either positively or negatively emotional cues, all participants practiced 
memories generated to both types of cues. Although this change meant that we could not 
examine effects of practicing just one type of memory, it was necessary, given the practical 
considerations of data collection at a small institution, to discover first whether practice effects 
would generalize to autobiographical memories. Another main change pertained to the nature of 
the cue. The experiment by Hertel et al. cued recall of the same sets of target words by all 
participants, regardless of the cue valence. For example, some participants learned to respond 
with paper to the cue praised, whereas others responded with paper to failing. In the current 
experiment, either praised paper or failing paper served as the cue to generate a memory, but 
subsequently only paper cued retrieval of the personal memory during retrieval practice and 
tests. These procedures represented our attempt to control characteristics of the recalled words or 
(in the current experiment) the type of event remembered, while experimentally varying 
emotional valence.  The third feature of the current procedure that deserves attention is the dual 
aspect of recall. To keep the practice phase less time consuming, we asked participants to 
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practice thinking about the full memory but to merely report a title to identify it. Therefore, 
participants initially titled each of their personal memories and then recalled those titles after the 
full memories when tested. Finally, we tested after a week’s delay, instead of a two-day delay. 
Participants and Design 
We recruited participants from the pool of students enrolled in Principles of Psychology 
across four semesters. In the absence of a prior similar method to use for determining sample 
size, we chose a cell size of 32 (as a factor of 8 for counterbalancing1). Hertel et al. (2017) had 
used a cell size of 20).  
  In class, students filled out copies of the Ruminative Response Scale of the Response 
Styles Questionnaire (RRS; Treynor, Gonzales, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003); those who scored in 
the first and fourth quartiles were invited to participate in categories we called nonruminators 
and ruminators, respectively. Within each group, we assigned four students to each of the eight 
counterbalancing conditions for determining which sets of three cueing nouns were assigned to 
each valence (e.g., praised paper vs. failing paper), each practice status (practiced or not), and 
each condition of the immediate test (tested or not tested immediately); three of the four students 
in each cell were female, and the other one male. Assignment was random before nearing the 
equal-n constraint. When data were set aside, another participant was chosen randomly from 
those who met criteria to be assigned to the same counterbalancing condition. 
Data were set aside and replaced if students’ RRS scores at the end of the first session 
placed them more than three points outside their original rumination group (6 from the 
nonruminators and 15 from the ruminators).2 We also replaced data from students who did not 
 
1 There were actually two counterbalancing factors; see the Materials section. 
2 Our experience suggests that undergraduate students do not show very stable scores on the RRS. Our practice in all 
experiments concerning rumination has always been to set aside data from individuals who do not produce a similar 
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take the Qualtrics test during the seventh or eighth day following Session 1 (5 nonruminators and 
3 ruminators), as well as data from students who misunderstood their instructions for the delayed 
test (5 nonruminators and 2 ruminators). Some loss from incomplete data is inevitable when a 
test is delivered via Qualtrics, a week after in-lab participation, even with a subsequent reminder. 
The misunderstood instructions grew out of our apparently successful cover story, concocted to 
discourage more retrieval practice during the week before the delayed test. We told them that we 
would be asking for new memories on the Qualtric form, and failing to read test instructions 
these participants produced only new memories. Finally, incomplete data were obtained from an 
additional six students, due to freezes in the program or experimenters choosing the wrong 
program. We report data from 64 students, 32 in each rumination group (24 women and 8 men 
per group and 3 vs. 1 per counterbalancing conditions within groups). Ages ranged from 18 to 
22. Five students identified, at least in part, as African American or Black, 8 as East Asian, 15 as 
Hispanic or Latinx, 2 as Middle Eastern, 2 as Southeast Asian, Indian, or Pakistani, 2 as Pacific 
Islander, 39 as White or Caucasian, and 2 as other. 
Materials 
 Because noun recall would be cued with one of two different adjectives (negative or 
positive), the unit for selecting items was an adjective-adjective-noun triad. Triads from Hertel et 
al. (2017) had been constructed to be relevant to rumination, so from those 32 triads, we initially 
chose the 10 that could successfully produce autobiographical memories in a pilot study. 
Examples included humiliating-intimate-moment, unappreciated-unexpected-favor, 
embarrassing-healthy-body. The remaining materials were selected by choosing nouns from the 
Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999), constructing associated 
 
score at the end of the (first) experimental session—a score that keeps them within a few points of the original group 
designation. 
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triads, and obtaining pilot ratings for the emotional meaning of each adjective-noun pair (as had 
been done for the earlier materials in a previous experiment). In the last step we obtained ratings 
for the ease of retrieving a personal memory, given each of the pairs as a cue. From these pilot 
data, we chose the 24 emotional triads. In addition, 10 neutral adjective-noun pairs were selected 
to serve as fillers. All materials are available by request. 
 Sets. Next, we distributed the 24 triads into four sets of 6 for the purpose of 
counterbalancing the materials with the experimental conditions, each set to be assigned equally 
often to each combination of adjective valence and practice status. Triads were distributed to the 
four sets in a manner that closely balanced the sets on the mean valence rating of each pair, the 
noun valence from ANEW, and the mean rating for ease of memory generation from the pilot 
data. The sets were also balanced (less closely) on frequency and number of letters of each 
member of the triad. Then the 6 triads in each set were divided into two subsets, one to be tested 
at the end of the first session and the other to be tested at delay for the first time.  
 Order. For the generation phase, we ordered cue pairs in a randomized block design, by 
assigning one pair from each set, plus a neutral pair, to each of six blocks; two additional neutral 
pairs began and ended the list. All subsequent tests preserved that relative ordering by 
maintaining block membership, but items were randomized anew within the blocks. 
Procedure 
Double-blind procedures meant that the experimenters did not know RRS scores and the students 
did not know the basis of their recruitment. To discourage further retrieval practice, the cover 
story for the delay focused on our need for more memories, but given the length of time that it 
takes to recall personal memories, we would be requesting more later, and they could be reported 
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on line, because the procedures have been learned. The procedure for the in-lab session is 














Figure 1. Schematic representation of the segments of procedure in the in-lab session. 
 
Generation phase. Instructions for the generation phase emphasized the importance of 
recalling memories of events that occurred within a single day and at a particular place (specific 
memories) at any time prior to one month before the session. The purpose of these specificity 
instructions was to encourage more detailed memories, not to investigate overgeneral memory; 
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from each other—more distinct than they might have been without such instructions.3 We 
provided examples of specific and nonspecific memories and told participants that the event 
could be important or trivial but not extremely unusual (“like what happened to you if you were 
in one of the recent hurricanes”). We asked participants to avoid reporting memories depicting 
non-events, such as a general attitude (e.g., “I love Christmas because we travel” when cued by 
enjoyable travel).  
 At the start of each trial, participants read the cueing pair aloud as they began to recruit 
an appropriate memory; when the memory came to mind they pressed the space bar and then 
typed a one-sentence description of the memory. We assured them that the memories would 
remain completely anonymous, with their identity concealed from the experimenter and 
everyone who viewed the memories subsequently. After typing the description they pressed the 
enter key to produce a new screen requesting a title for the memory. We cautioned them to 
generate a unique title with respect to the other memories they reported in the session, because 
the title would represent the memory throughout the session. Participants typed the title and 
reported it aloud, so that the experimenter could record it (for study during practice). 
Experimenters requested a new title when a previous title was repeated. Subsequent to title 
report, participants pressed the enter key to reveal a rating scale. The scale was a series of evenly 
spaced numerals that began with “extremely negative = 1” and ended with “9 = extremely 
positive.” Participants typed a number to represent the memory, and then a new trial began. 
Before the start of experimental trials, the experimenter walked through a practice trial, answered 
 
3 There were no significant differences in the percentages of specific memories generated, according to any factor in 
the design, all ps > .28, all ηp2 < .02; overall M = 85.5, 95%  CI [81.3, 89.9]. Out of the recalled memories on the 
final test, the same pattern obtained, all ps > . 47  all ηp2 < .02; overall M = 76.3, 95%  CI [70.3, 82.4]. The apparent 
reduction likely resulted from the on-line nature of the test (i.e. no experimenter stressing specificity). 
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questions, made corrections, and then moved behind a screen to record titles. Across all trials, 
cueing pairs were displayed for 6 s, and all response segments were self-paced. 
 Practice phase.  After a short rest, the next phase consisted of three tasks, presented 
three times in succession (see Figure 1): guided study of the cueing nouns paired with the 
participant-generated titles, math problems, and a short memory test. In guided study, the 
experimenter handed the participants a sheet of paper containing each cueing noun and title and 
asked them to study each pair for 2 s before moving down the page to the next pair at the sound 
of a beep (turning the page half way). We asked participants to distribute their study time evenly, 
without skipping or returning to previous lines. In the math task, 20 simple addition and 
multiplication problems were each presented on the monitor for 6 s and followed by a screen for 
typing the answer. Finally, on the practice test, the 12 cueing nouns from the sets identified for 
practice, plus the 10 nouns from the neutral pairs, were each presented for 4 s. We stressed the 
importance of thinking about the generated memory during the display, which was followed by a 
screen for typing the corresponding title (or “forget” if retrieval failed). Again, these three tasks 
were repeated in succession two more times during the practice phase. 
 Immediate test.  Following another brief rest period and then 3 min during which 
participants tried to solve problems akin to Ravens’ Matrices, we administered the immediate 
test of half of the practiced and half of the unpracticed memories (12 cues from the 
counterbalanced sets, and 5 neutral fillers). Each trial began with a 4-s display of the cueing 
noun, followed by a request to type the memory, and then another request to type the title. 
Following the test, participants completed the RRS and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; 
Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996, with the suicide item removed). 
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 Delayed test.  One week after their participation in the lab session, we emailed the 
students a link to the Qualtrics test, designed to cue all memories and titles with the nouns from 
the pairs used at generation. We told participants that they would not be able to stop, save, and 
start again and that they should find a quiet place with minimal distraction where they could 
complete the test by 9 pm. All noun cues were presented for 4 s; each was followed by a self-
paced interval for typing the memory and then another for typing the title. In the last part of each 
trial, participants rated the emotional value of the memory on the scale that they had also used 
for generation, but we told them to judge the emotion in the memory as retrieved on the test and 
not to report a remembered emotion from a week ago.  At the end of the test of 34 trials, the 
students again responded to the RRS and the BDI-II. They received credit for participating only 
if they had complied with instructions regarding the timing of the delayed test. 
Scoring 
 Descriptive responses on the immediate and delayed tests were scored for accuracy by 
two scorers, independently and blind to participant group. Because our purpose did not concern 
memory for details or degree of emotion, the basis for judging accuracy was simply whether the 
typed description on the test referred to the memory as originally generated to the same cue. 
Titles produced during practice and on each test were scored as accurate only if any form of the 
same word(s) produced during generation was typed in response to the same cueing noun. 
Scorers were trained on the data from several participants before they scored independently. 
They agreed about 97.9% of immediately tested memories and 96.4% of memories at delay. A 
third person resolved all differences. In the final sample, over 90% of the errors were 
nonresponses (forget); the remainder were new memories or responses to other cues. 
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Results 
 Figure 2 depicts the important outcomes from this experiment. Retrieval practice 
increased the recall of the initially generated autobiographical memories and their titles a week 
later. And if the memories were cued by positive words, ruminators experienced a smaller 
practice effect. These results from the delayed test are presented first; they are followed by 
reports of recall during practice and on the immediate test. Finally, we describe the emotion 
ratings provided for the memories at generation and at delayed testing. The important rating 
outcome was that the cues functioned to produce emotion-consistent memories. 
Percentage of Memories Recalled at Delay 
The central questions concerned the percentages of generated memories recalled again on 
the delayed test, at which point recall was cued by the noun member of the pair used to cue 
generation (e.g., paper, not failing paper or praised paper). The percentages recalled were 
submitted to a mixed design analysis of variance, with a between-subjects factor for participant 
group and within-subject factors for practice status (practiced or not), valence of the pair that 
cued generation (positive or negative), and the status on the immediate test (tested or not). An 
additional between-subjects factor was included for counterbalancing condition (4 levels for set 
distribution across the combination of cue-valence/practice-status) in these and all subsequent 
analyses, for the purpose of removing systematic variance from the error term. The significant 
effects involving this factor are not reported.  
First, the results replicated the finding of a practice main effect, previously obtained for 
other types of memories; practiced personal memories were better recalled than unpracticed ones 
(Mpracticed = 61.40, SE = 2.55, vs. Munpracticed = 43.81, SE = 2.11), F(1, 56) = 54.19, MSE = 730.20, 
p < .001 ηp
2 = .49. Next, we report effects involving the testing status on the immediate test.  




















Figure 2. The percentage of memories (A) and titles (B) recalled after a 1-week delay following 
initial generation. Memories were generated from either negative or positive cueing pairs and 
then given titles. Half of the memories and titles in each valence condition were practiced three 
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Memories tested at the end of the lab session were recalled better at delay than those not 
test (Mtested = 60.87, SE = 2.23, vs. Mnot = 44.33, SE = 2.34), F(1, 56) = 57.83, MSE = 605.82, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .51. This outcome clearly reflects the fact that the immediate test provided another (or 
the only) occasion for retrieval practice, independent of the effect of the three practice trials for 
half of the memories. Moreover, as can be expected, the effect of immediate testing was smaller 
for previously practiced memories (Mtested = 67.19, SE = 3.01, vs. Mnot = 55.60, SE = 2.94) than 
for those not practiced (Mtested = 54.56, SE = 2.30, vs. Mnot = 33.07, SE = 2.67), F(1, 56) = 6.99, 
MSE = 448.87, p = .011, ηp
2 = .11. No other effect involving immediate testing status reached 
significance, p > .35. And so the effects of primary interest, shown in Figure 2A, can be 
understood without confounds from immediate testing. 
The first of these effects was the interaction of participant group with the valence of the 
generation cue, F(1, 56) = 5.02, MSE = 591.92, p = .029, ηp
2 = .08. Regardless of practice status, 
the two rumination groups recalled similar percentages of memories generated from negative 
cues (M = 53.00, SE = 3.16, vs. M = 52.34, SE = 3.34, for non-ruminators and ruminators, 
respectively), but ruminators recalled many fewer memories generated from positive cues (M = 
47.40, SE = 3.38, vs. M = 57.69, SE = 3.29, for non-ruminators).  Two additional interactions 
were marginally significant. One was the interaction of practice status with rumination group, 
and the other was the three-way interaction of valence, practice, and group, F(1, 56) = 3.60, MSE 
= 695.86, p = .063, ηp
2 = .06. We report the statistics for the latter, due to our a priori interest in 
whether practice effects depend on valence, especially for ruminators.   
Follow-up tests subsequent to the three-way interaction examined recall separately for 
negative and positive cueing pairs. The recall of memories generated to negative cues benefitted 
substantially from retrieval practice, F(1, 56) = 21.24, MSE = 425.38, p < .001, ηp
2 = .28, and this 
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practice effect did not interact with rumination group, p = .971.  However, as seen in the last four 
bars in Figure 2A, the simple interaction of practice status with group was significant for 
memories that had been generated to positive cues, F(1, 56) = 8.98, MSE = 287.65, p = .004, ηp
2 
= .14. The two groups did not differ in recalling unpracticed memories generated to positive 
cues, p = .815.  But if these memories had been designated for practice, ruminators recalled 
fewer, F(1, 56) = 12.24, MSE = 485.86, p < .001, ηp
2 = .18. 4 
Percentage of Titles Recalled at Delay 
In preview, the pattern of effects on delayed recall of titles was strikingly similar to the 
pattern for memories and suggests that if a memory was recalled, so was its title (although titles 
were recalled somewhat less frequently in each condition). Quite obviously, practiced titles were 
recalled better than unpracticed titles on the delayed test, F(1, 56) = 67.99, MSE = 838.03, p < 
.001 ηp
2 = .55 (see Figure 2b).  Regardless of the other factors, titles tested at the end of the lab 
session were recalled better a week later than those not tested (M = 57.0, SE = 2.59, vs. M = 41.4, 
SE = 2.62, respectively), F(1, 56) = 39.85, MSE = 84.92, p < .001, ηp
2 = .42. Moreover, as we 
found with memory recall, the status of prior testing significantly interacted with the factor for 
practice, F(1, 56) = 8.48, MSE = 541.64, p = .005, ηp
2 = .13. Practice produced a greater 
advantage for titles omitted from the immediate test (Mpracticed = 54.95, SE = 3.24, vs. Mnot = 
27.86, SE = 3.04), compared to immediately tested titles (M practiced = 64.59, SE = 3.16, vs. Mnot = 
49.48, SE = 2.87). Otherwise, the status of immediate testing did not interact with other factors,  
p > .31. 
 
4 The practice effect on positive-memory recall by ruminators was marginally significant, F(1, 28) = 4.09, MSE = 
343.94, p = .053, ηp2 = .13 
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In a pattern similar to the pattern for memory recall, the practice effect was qualified by 
the significant three-way interaction of cue valence, practice status, and rumination group,  
F(1, 56) = 7.70, MSE = 648.37, p = .007, ηp
2 = .12. (All other effects in the full design were 
nonsignificant, p > .22.) There were clear effects of title practice when the corresponding 
memories had been generated to negative cueing pairs, F(1, 56) = 33.34, MSE = 437.87, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .37; and that “negative” practice effect did not interact with group, p = .485.  And 
although the “positive” practice effect was even larger, F(1, 56) = 45.50, MSE = 305.33, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .45, it depended on the rumination status of the participant, as shown by the 
significant simple interaction, F(1, 56) = 10.25, MSE = 305.33, p = .002, ηp
2 = .16. Another way 
to understand recall of titles chosen for memories generated to positive cues is to see that the two 
participant groups recalled unpracticed titles at similar levels, p = .613, but the ruminators 
recalled many fewer practiced titles, F(1, 56) = 8.01, MSE = 554.61, p = .006, ηp
2 = .12.  
Percentage of Titles Retrieved During Practice 
We next report percentages of titles correctly recalled during the practice trials. The 
analysis of variance included a between-subjects factor for participant group (and another for 
counterbalancing condition) and within-subjects factors for trial number (1 – 3) and the valence 
of the cue during generation. Data were missing for one non-ruminative participant. 
Participants improved with practice and feedback across the three trials (M = 75.8, 81.8, 
and 87.8), F(2, 109.82) = 49.42, MSE = 94.02, p < .001, ηp
2 = .47 (using the Huynh-Feldt Epsilon 
to adjust for the violation of sphericity). Relevant to possible evidence for a ruminative bias 
during practice, all other main effects and interactions were small and nonsignificant. The largest 
was the interaction of valence with rumination group, F(1, 55) = 1.73, MSE = 450.60, p = .193, 
ηp
2 = .03. Descriptively, ruminators recalled somewhat fewer positive titles (M = 79.5 vs. 83.7 
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for non-ruminators), whereas they recalled similar percentages of negative titles (M = 82.3 vs. 
81.7, respectively). 
Percentage of Memories and Titles Recalled, End of Session 
With a mixed design identical to the analysis of delayed recall, the percentages of 
memories and titles recalled at the end of the lab session were separately submitted to an analysis 
of variance. The percentages of memories recalled at the end of the session did not differ 
according to any of the factors or their interactions (overall M = 82.5, SE = 2.06), p > .31. Title 
recall was superior if the titles had been practiced (M = 83.7, SE = 2.46) than if they had not (M 
= 76.6, SE = 3.24), F(1, 56) = 6.18, MSE = 517.54, p = .015, ηp
2 = .10. All other effects were 
nonsignificant, p > .34.  
Emotion Ratings 
To investigate whether the emotional quality of the memories corresponded to the 
valence of the cueing pairs, we evaluated the students’ emotion ratings during generation, and to 
investigate whether the ratings of the recalled memories was affected by practice, the same 
analysis was conducted for delayed accurate recall. The mean rating across items that qualified 
in each cell of the design was submitted to separate analyses of variance at generation and 
delayed testing. Significant differences according to the valence of the cueing pair occurred at 
each measurement point. At generation, F(1, 56) = 890.73, MSE = 0.870, p < .001, ηp
2 = .94. At 
delay, F(1, 51) = 255.45, MSE = 2.21, p < .001, ηp
2 = .83. At generation, ruminators gave lower 
(more negative) ratings (M = 4.9, SE = .089 vs. non-ruminators M = 5.2, SE = 089), F(1, 56) = 
4.29, MSE = 1.01, p = .043, ηp
2 = .07.  However, this group difference disappeared at delay, p = 
.193. All other effects were nonsignificant, p > .133. The means at each point are reported in 
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Table 1 
Means (Standard Errors) of Participants’ Scores and Rated Emotional Value of Memories 








Emotion ratings     
    Negative cueing pairs 3.4 (.14) 3.1 (.14) 3.5 (.18) 3.0 (.17) 
    Positive cueing pairs 6.9 (.10) 6.6 (.10) 6.4 (.18) 6.4 (.18) 
Questionnaire scores     
     RRS 30.8 (1.00) 64.2 (1.44) 29.0 (0.98) 58.0 (1.85) 
     BDI-II  6.7 (0.95) 21.3 (1.81)  6.0 (1.44) 20.9 (1.46) 
 
Note. n = 32, except in columns with superscripts; a n = 29, b n = 30 for ratings, c n = 31 
for questionnaire measures. Analyses were not performed on the RRS and BDI-II 
scores, due to non-independent sampling. 
 
Table 1,5 along with the mean scores on the RRS and BDI-II at the end of the lab session and a 
week later.  
Discussion 
Autobiographical memories are more likely to come to mind when cued if they have been 
previously practiced. More specifically, our demonstration of this practice effect applies to 
intentional recall that benefits from multiple prior repetitions of the same intentional act. 
 
5An additional analysis of emotion ratings that included a factor for measurement point did reveal a 
significant main effect for session, F(1, 51) = 7.71, MSE = 0.680, p = .008, ηp2 = .13, and a nonsignificant 
trend for an interaction of valence with session, F(1, 51) = 3.66, MSE = 0.893, p = .061, ηp2 = .07. On 
average, ratings were 0.21 points lower at delay—0.05 points lower for negative memories and 0.37 
points lower for positive memories. Interpretation must take into account the confound that means were 
calculated across varying numbers of memories, due both to forgetting and to the uncontrolled conditions 
for the delayed test. 
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Similarly, ruminators repeatedly and sometimes intentionally focus on past events and thereby 
produce a readily accessible memory for future episodes of rumination.  
The practice effect in our results might have been aided by the use of a descriptor—we 
called it a title—and that feature is also not unlike common experience. Our participants 
frequently chose titles that were names of people or places, or topics that might naturally remind 
them of the memory if they occurred in the course of a typical day. For example: To the 
generation cue thoughtless friend, one of our participants remembered that he had “made a 
derogatory remark about ‘life choices’ to a pansexual friend, and later realized how callous what 
[he] said was and apologized.” He titled the memory “Insult” and remembered the title and the 
memory a week later, even though it had not been assigned for practice.  
As the example possibly illustrates, ruminators sometimes focus on past events in order 
to create a new understanding or a better resolution of conflict inherent in at least the 
interpretation of the episode, if not its reality. They believe that such acts of remembering might 
help them feel better in the long run, even though rumination often worsens their moods 
(Takano, Van Grieken, & Raes, 2019). And each time this memory comes to mind, again it 
becomes even more available for future fruitless access. Such remembering is self-perpetuating. 
Our results also suggest that self-perpetuating memories are equally applicable to people 
who do not ruminate…if they would happen to initiate the process of practicing recall of specific 
memories, negative or positive. And maybe this is a topic relevant, for example, to late-life 
recollection: Intentional reminiscence perpetuates itself and contributes to the positive memory 
bias in aging populations (see Mather, 2006). But the point for our purpose is that ruminators are 
the people who actually do initiate the practice of repeated recall, and compared to non-
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ruminators, instructions to practice recalling positive events was unfortunately less productive 
for future remembering. 
Our secondary finding—that the practice of positive memories was not as beneficial for 
ruminators—was inconsistent with the hope that positive practice might overcome ruminative 
recall (see Hertel et al., 2017). The term rumination refers to repetitive thought patterns that 
typify depressed people, and there are similar asymmetric patterns of recall in the literature on 
depression and memory. (The two samples in this experiment separate on BDI-II scores, with a 
few exceptions.) Among the several findings that suggest a depression-related impairment in the 
recall of positive memories is evidence that happy memories are harder to retrieve (Rottenberg, 
Hildner, & Gotlib, 2006) and that fewer memories are produced to positive cueing words 
(Young, Erickson, & Drevets, 2012). Similarly, compared to others, people scoring high on an 
on-line depression measure less effectively revised negative interpretations after reading 
disconfirmatory positive information (Everaert, Bronstein, Cannon, & Joormann, 2018). On the 
initially hopeful side, we might consider recent evidence that a positive bias in recalling target 
words, established through retrieval practice (training), transferred to dysphoric students’ 
autobiographical recall, but transfer occurred only if the students had experienced a positive bias 
before training (Vrijsen et al., 2019).  
 Both Vrijsen et al. (2019) and Hertel et al. (2017) successfully trained delayed recall of 
positive words by ruminators, yet the current experiment was less successful in training recall of 
positive personal memories. How can we understand this difference? Positive personal memories 
sometimes are accompanied by increasingly sad moods for people categorized as depressed (e.g., 
Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007), possibly because the positive memories incur ruminative 
comparisons with their current state, and positive words lack the connections for cueing such 
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comparisons, especially Swahili translations (Vrijsen et al., 2019). This difference therefore 
suggests that positive personal memories might have been attended less well (e.g., less 
elaboratively) either during practice trials or subsequently in the week prior to the final test. In 
addressing this speculation, we found little support for the idea that ruminators recalled fewer 
positive titles during practice, and we have no evidence concerning the extent to which they 
brought the full memories to mind during practice or later in the week.  We do, however, know 
that positive titles and memories were recalled equally well by ruminators and nonruminators at 
the end of the lab session. Therefore, a sensible way to understand that autobiographical recall 
might show different practice effects, compared, to word recall, is to suggest that the positive 
memories were entertained less often during the delay before the final test, or not fully enough 
during practice to sustain recall beyond the session.6 
 Before we settle on the idea that positive autobiographical recall is doomed to minimal 
practice effects for ruminators, another procedural difference should be considered. In the two 
experiments on retrieval practice with words, participants practiced words from just one 
condition of emotional valence. In the experiment by Hertel et al. (2017) they practiced recalling 
nouns cued by either positive or negative adjectives (and neutral ones), and in the experiment by 
Vrijsen et al. (2019) they practiced English translations of positive or neutral Swahili words. In 
the current experiment, participants practiced positive and negative memories. A reasonable 
suggestion, therefore, is that the coincidental practice of negative memories might hold attention, 
even during the positive trials. There is some evidence to suggest that ruminators have trouble 
 
6 Readers might notice that ruminators and nonruminators recalled unpracticed positive and negative memories 
equally well. We assume that that this baseline level of recall reflects the probability that the test cues work similarly 
to their cuing tendency during the generation phase, as well as the similar tendencies to forget the episodic context 
of having produced them a week earlier. 
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switching attention away from active negative content (Joormann & Gotlib, 2008; Koster, De 
Lissnyder, & De Raedt, 2013).  
 Before summarizing, we offer yet another consideration regarding these results. Our 
experimental model of memory-inbued rumination assumes deliberate attempts to retrieve 
memories during practice, whereas the real-world version of remembering during rumination is 
more likely involuntary. Follow-up experiments might try to encourage involuntary retrieval (by 
presenting the cues multiple times in a different task, for example). As a starting place, however, 
we thought it was important to ensure retrieval by deliberate invitation, given the limitation of 
experimental sessions and the associated difficulties involved in cueing involuntary memories 
over longer stretches of time.(see Berntsen, 1998). Extrapolating from other comparisons of 
voluntary and involuntary autobiographical memories leads us to imagine that the valence 
difference we obtained for voluntary practice effects would be even larger for involuntary 
practice effects (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008; cf. Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken, & Watson, 
2012). 
 A final note concerns our difficulties in data collection, apparent by examining the 
amount of data we set aside and replaced (see our description of participants). One major reason 
for the need to replace was the failure to complete the final test, even after reminders. We can 
speculate that these students might have reconsidered their need for experiment credit or their 
willingness to spend the time and effort. We also lost participants who believed our cover story 
about new memories and ignored the test instructions; clearly we should have created a different 
cover story.  The largest reason for loss—change in rumination status by the end of the lab 
session—is difficult to understand. Some participants (often dysphoric) were scheduled as long 
as a month after screening, mainly because they were difficult to recruit. On the other hand, even 
Practicing Autobiographical Recall  25 
though the RRS is understood to be a measure of trait rumination, some RRS changes occurred 
for participants who participated soon after screening. Are such changes indications of 
exaggeration during class screening, or are they reflections of either regression to the mean or 
reticence to reveal their thoughts during individual administration?  Not knowing why they 
occurred, we chose a relatively conservative approach in requiring the session scores to be within 
3 points of the cut-off at screening. Our sense, therefore, is that the final samples do represent 
ruminators and nonruminators. 
In conclusion, we emphasize the finding that retrieval practice serves to perpetuate 
retrieval of autobiographical memories. From a clinical point of view, such an outcome is 
potentially good or bad for ruminators:  Bad if it perpetuates ruminative recall; good if it works 
to encourage happy memories (and ruminators did indeed produce a marginally significant 
practice effect for positive memories). We can speculate, for example, that the clinical technique 
of discussing negative experience is accompanied by the danger of perpetuating its recall. We 
can also suggest that if happy memories are practiced in the context of also practicing ruminative 
memories, the good outcomes will be less accessible for ruminators. Future research might more 
closely replicate the procedures used by Hertel et al. (2017) and ask ruminators to practice only 
positive personal memories. We hope we do not seem too pessimistic in suggesting that asking 
ruminators to practice only happy personal memories outside the laboratory or therapy session is 
at best a slow path to change.   
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